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This paper considers the current economic vulnerability of 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the role rural development can play 
in overcoming this problem. It briefly explains the background 
to the critical shortage of foreign exchange, and the failure of 
agricultural growth to keep pace with population growth in many 
SSA countries. It stresses that development among the rural 
poor should be the centrepiece of future efforts, and examines 
the obstacles to be overcome and policy choices to be made in 
achieving such a focus. It does not argue that there is a 
comprehensive strategy appropriate to all countries in the 
region, but suggests an analytical approach to the elaboration 
of strategy in different national and local contexts.
This paper is a shortened version of a working paper with the 
same title prepared by the authors for the Economic and Planning 
Department of the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development. It attempts to distil the result of recent 
experience with rural development strategy and projects in 
Africa, but it is written with a general audience in mind, hence 
the absence of footnotes and references.
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Economic Vulnerability i n SSA ★
The most general and well documented symptom of economic 
vulnerability in SSA is the rapid deterioration in the balance of 
payments of countries in the region. For Africa as a whole 
(excluding S.Africa) the IMF has estimated that the current 
account deficit on non-OPEC countries more than doubled between 
1977 and 1981. It remained close to 1981 levels (US $-14.0bn) in 
1982 and 1983. The IMF estimated that gross foreign reserves of 
the region at the end of 1 983 met only three weeks' import 
demands.
Evidence that S S A 1s problems are only partially explained by the 
recent world recession is particularly strong in the case of 
agricultural production. In most countries of the region 
agriculture accounts for the largest share of GDP, and is the 
source of employment and incomes for a large majority of the 
population. Agricultural production is thus fundamental to 
general economic performance, and to the welfare of the 
population.
Although agricultural production data are highly unreliable, 
those that exist at least suggest the magnitude of current 
deficiencies. Taking the region as a whole, and most SSA
economies individually, 1970-81 annual rates of agricultural 
production and export growth were below those for population 
growth and below those of the previous decade. Estimated total 
food production grew at 1.7 per cent annually, and food 
production per capita was approximately 10 per cent lower at the 
end of the period than at the beginning. Reliance upon food 
imports (and food aid) has accordingly grown. The total volume 
of agricultural exports actually fell.
While a majority of states still rely on agriculture for the 
largest portion of export earnings, employment, and incomes, in 
some states the pattern of economic development has been strongly 
influenced by mineral or manufacturing production. At least 15 
SSA economies derive a higher proportion of their export earnings 
from fuels, metals and minerals (including diamonds) than from 
agricultural exports. However, development in other sectors has 
generally failed to compensate for the problems of agriculture, 
in some cases has made matters worse and has in several instances 
been crippled by low food, foreign exchange and raw material 
inputs from agriculture. The growth of industrial output in SSA 
averaged about 3.3 per cent a year in the 1960s, and 1970s
* In this paper, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is defined as the 
continent of Africa and geographically associated islands 
excluding Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, the former 
Spanish Sahara, Republic of South Africa and Reunion.
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(including mining, construction and utilities, as well as 
manufacturing) - well below the averages experienced elsewhere in 
the developing world. Although there has been impressive growth 
of manufacturing output in some countries ( eg, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Ivory Coast) over extended periods, most of this growth has 
achieved very limited employment creation relative to volume of 
investment and has been based upon the simpler forms of import 
replacement. Without the development of complementary export 
markets (inhibited by world recession and the similarities among 
industrial structures in neighbouring African countries), or a 
significant expansion of internal demand (constrained by 
agricultural performance as well as international conditions) the 
limits of such patterns of industrial growth appear to have been 
reached for the time being.
Furthermore, the existing industrial capacity, and the 
infrastructure which serves distribution systems, tend to reflect 
the international relative prices of earlier periods. Capacity 
requiring intensive use of imported inputs, and in particular of 
imported energy and skills, has either become uneconomic as 
relative prices have changed, or, worse, has become inoperable in 
circumstances of extreme foreign exchange shortage. In many 
countries, the burden of supporting these structures, and (in the 
absence of adequate domestic food production) of feeding the 
urban populations that have grown with them, rests with the 
foreign exchange earning capacity of agriculture.
The domestic effects of the reduction in foreign exchange 
availability have quickly become evident. In many countries 
there are severe shortages not only of imported consumer goods, 
but of essential inputs for potentially efficient productive 
activities, including transport, processing, storage, health, 
education, agriculture and manufacturing. Such shortages -
often compounded by misallocation of the supplies that remain 
available - cause under-utilisation of capacity and breakdowns in 
transport systems; these, in turn, reduce the output and sales 
upon which government tax revenues depend. Resultant
difficulties in reducing budget deficits tend to magnify the 
balance of payments problem. Attempts to ration foreign 
exchange, and to use price controls to dampen the inflationary 
impact of supply difficulties have sometimes encouraged the 
growth of parallel markets and smuggling, thus further reducing 
the availability of goods in the legal distribution system. 
Shortages of basic goods in rural areas create a disincentive to 
increases in marketed production, while breakdowns of transport 
systems have an even greater disincentive impact. Governments 
have been forced to reduce real expenditure on new projects and 
existing services in an effort to contain the balance of payments 
problem. These cuts risk further dampening of expansion 
prospects and jeopardise the major post-independence achievements
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of expansion in education and health services, associated with 
great advances in literacy and reductions in mortality rates.
The human cost of recent experience in the region has been 
enormous. Since levels of nutrition in 1970 were already
inadequate for a majority of Africans and external account
constraints limited food imports, the slow growth of food
production has been associated with increases in hunger and 
malnutrition-related diseases. This is not only true of those 
economies - such as Angola, Uganda or Zaire - which have suffered 
dislocation from war or other upheavals, but in the past few 
years it has also become true of ones which previously had 
experienced improvements in nutritional standards, such as 
Tanzania.
Decelerating agricultural output growth has contributed to the 
overall decline in average real rural household incomes in most 
SSA economies; the decline has sometimes been worsened and 
sometimes alleviated by changes in agricultural product prices 
relative to the prices of rural household purchases of urban 
goods and services. The deterioration in real income has been 
particularly severe for peasant producers of export crops, for 
those in isolated areas which have lost effective access to 
markets and for those hit by environmental catastrophes (eg 
drought or chronic ecological degradation). While the producers 
of export crops have commonly enjoyed incomes above the median of 
rural (and sometimes national) household incomes - at the price
of considerable instability in those incomes - the other two 
groups are predominantly among the rural poor.
Recent Development Policy
Political stability has often required levels of wages and public 
spending which, in the absence of controls, raise demand for 
imports to levels which available foreign exchange earnings 
cannot sustain. When a balance of payments crisis has ensued, 
governments have often opted for controls to protect foreign 
exchange reserves. In some cases subsidies for urban consumers, 
controls, taxation of rural production, costly marketing systems 
and shortage of incentive goods have helped to reduce incentives 
to rural producers and to reduce relative rural incomes. Rural 
people have reacted by migrating to the towns, by producing less, 
and/or by refusing to market their output through formal channels 
and withdrawing into subsistence production, smuggling or 
parallel markets.
Immediately following independence there were few short-run 
alternatives in most countries to continued dependence upon 
agricultural or mineral exports. Prospects for a long run 
reduction in this dependence were viewed in terms of
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import-substituting industrialisation - with associated provision 
of large scale infrastructure - and the 'transformation' of 
traditional agriculture to yield a surplus upon which 
industrialisation and national economic integration could be 
based. Thus, in rural areas, it was thought necessary for nomads 
to become settled, for crop production to be increased by 
large-scale often mechanised schemes (following the successful 
example of the Gezira scheme in the Sudan), and for marketing to 
be channelled through large commercial or state organisations. 
Countries sympathetic to both market-oriented and 
centrally-planned forms of economic organisation (or a mixture of 
the two) adopted major elements of this approach.
The combination of this strategic orientation with the pressures 
upon macroeconomic policy already described often led to an 
incentive structure biased against exports in general and 
agricultural production in particular. Hence the now
widely-voiced criticisms of over-valued exchange rates (often 
linked to the maintenance of urban real wage levels), subsidies 
for better-off urban consumers at the expense of rural producers, 
tariff structures and trade and payments licensing systems. It 
also contributed to an emphasis in the allocation of public 
resources upon large-scale infrastructure and the build-up of 
recurrent subsidies to urban areas instead of agricultural 
investment, rural services, and especially the kinds of projects 
that would have raised living standards in the poorer rural areas 
from which migrants tended to come.
Foreign advice has in the past favoured an emphasis in 
development strategy on large-scale capital formation in 
infrastructure and industry. Flows of foreign aid have been 
directed in line with this approach, with consequences that are 
now familiar: a bias towards capital-intensity and complex
techniques; a preference for large projects with a high 
proportion of foreign exchange costs; lack of emphasis on 
maintenance, recurrent cost support and training; failure to 
reach the poorest groups and the more remote areas. The 
maintenance of the capital stock created by these flows now 
absorbs a substantial part of government revenues and foreign 
exchange earnings.
A Response With A Rural Focus
It is clear that, if these problems and constraints persist, the 
countries of SSA will suffer a downward spiral of deterioration 
with appalling consequences for their peoples. It is arguable 
that weather, terms of trade deterioration, invasions (eg Angola, 
Tanzania) and civil wars (eg Chad) are the main causes of the 
poor performance. However, whatever the causes, domestic 
responses are needed; African economies cannot sustain their
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populations and societies (or governments) with average regional 
growth ot food production two-thirds that of population and 
growth of agricultural exports negative. Some progress in food 
production - though not so clearly in per person availability - 
seems to be institutionalised and modestly steady in other parts 
of the world: but food output per person is falling, unstable
and without institutionalised support on a serious scale in most 
low-income countries of SSA.
The poorest groups in SSA are predominantly rural dwellers 
engaged in agriculture. This is the fundamental reason why 
raising the output and incomes of farmers (and rural workers in 
general) is central to development strategy in the region. 
Moreover, weaknesses in the rural sector in many countries have 
made the process of adjustment to international economic shocks 
all the more difficult. Rural development is the area of
strategy where short-term adjustment, long-term growth, and 
provision of basic services and nutritional needs for the poorest 
all call for measures to raise agricultural production by the 
quickest means, raise the proportion of available resources 
allocated to rural development, and close the gaps between the 
real incomes of rural producers and those of urban workers.
The proportion of the population in SSA dependent upon 
agricultural activities to provide a livelihood tends to be 
higher than in other parts of the world. In the low-income 
countries of the region approximately 80 per cent of the labour 
force provides for cash or subsistence needs from agriculture 
(probably including rural non-farm activities), while in the 
region as a whole the proportion is in excess of 70 per cent.
About one person in ten among labour force participants receives 
a regular wage or salary, while the other nine rely on 
self-employment or self-provisioning activities for their own and 
their dependents' livelihoods. Agriculture provides most of 
these self-employment and subsistence livelihoods.
Even if industrial and service sector employment grow at rates 
corresponding to the most optimistic prognosis for general
economic growth, more than two-thirds of new entrants to the SSA 
labour force will seek agricultural employment and incomes. The 
labour force is expected to grow at three per cent a year from 
1980 to 2000 on the basis of ILO projections. This growth rate 
implies the addition of 110 mn workers to the labour force over 
the period, of which in excess of 70 mn will need to derive their 
incomes from rural work. The same ILO data suggest that about 97 
mn workers were absorbed in agriculture and rural non-farm work 
in 1980 , so that the projections imply an increase of more than 
two-thirds in the labour force seekinq rural work by the year
2000 . Such projections are, of course, subject to a very wide
margin of error, but the magnitudes are sufficiently large to 
indicate the priority that must be given to rural development.
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Providing a livelihood for these additional workers and their 
dependants implies an increase in output for self-provisioning 
from the small farm (or the livestock herd in pastoral systems) - 
and also for local exchanges with village artisans, whose 
opportunities will expand as the market for rural non-farm
services expands. In some areas, the expansion of non-farm work 
opportunities is vital to ease pressure upon scarce cultivable 
land. Where land is less scarce, non-farm services are in any
case needed to enable farmers' innovations and new infrastructure 
to be maintained by locally-available skills.
The relationship between agricultural production, rural 
development and the balance of payments is not simply a matter of 
agricultural exports. It is true that the rate of increase in
agricultural export earnings has fallen sharply since the
mid-1960s, and earnings have declined in a number of countries, 
but the terms of trade and volume difficulties causing this 
problem have been compounded by the movement of population to the 
towns and the subsequent rise in food imports. Part of the 
solution to structural balance of payments problems thus lies in 
increased domestic food production, and the reduction in 
migration rates which improved rural incomes and services could 
br ing.
Limited market size places a constraint upon further industrial 
and service sector development which the generation of new rural 
incomes can relax. Very few SSA countries are in a position to 
accelerate industrial development by reliance upon manufactured 
exports, and current world economic conditions make it unlikely 
that the prospects for exports of manufactures will improve 
significantly in the near future. Without additional demand 
stimulated by rural development and agricultural production, the 
potential for optimally-sized production runs and full use of 
capacity will be reduced. Current patterns of
import-substituting industrialisation are in any case heavily 
dependent upon subsidies or protection, and while under some 
circumstances these may contribute to higher domestic product, 
they tend to reduce real incomes outside the industrial sector.
These arguments in favour of a strong rural emphasis in future 
development strategy also point to an important distinction 
between growth of agricultural production and improvement in 
rural welfare. An increase in agricultural production, without 
a relatively even spread of the incomes thus generated, will not 
maximise employment, reduce migration and create a substantial 
new market for industrial output. Conversely, increases in 
agricultural output and productivity are unlikely to be sustained 
unless direct investments in productive capacity are complemented 
by improved health and education services, transport and 
marketing facilities, and the growth of rural service industries
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(from implement supply and repair to retail distribution of 
consumer goods) . A strategy of rural development therefore 
requires attention to the distribution of productive activity, as 
well as its growth, and to the expansion of non-farm activities 
in rural areas.
Rural Development and the Rural Poorest
The case for a redirection of effort toward rural development 
rests not only upon its potential benefits for the majority of 
the population (and for the poorest sections of the population) ; 
it also draws support from the contribution which accelerated 
rural development can make to improving food security, 
strengthening the balance of payments, reducing migration (and 
thus improving urban welfare), creating mass markets for 
non-agricultural goods and services and increasing domestic 
industrial input supplies. Where urban consumers now buy in 
'parallel' markets, increased food production can reduce the cost 
of food to them without requiring lower prices to growers.
These benefits will not be secured, however, if the measures 
taken within a rural development strategy tend to by-pass large 
sections of the rural population - either because the measures 
deliberately ignore important groups (eg promotion of 
highly-mechanised export crop or staple grain estates), or 
because measures intended to be of general applicability are 
appropriated by well-placed farmers (eg credit or extension 
facilities more easily taken up by commercially-oriented 
smallholders). The majority of rural producers in SSA are only 
1 part-participants' in production for cash - much of their effort 
is devoted to provisioning, watering, fuelling and housing 
themselves and their immediate families. The strengthening of 
the production systems under which they do this is therefore 
vital; it provides the foundation from which additional marketed 
surplus can come without displacing traditional mechanisms of 
food security. Other approaches to rural development, less 
directly aimed at traditional production and the poorest groups, 
are likely either to bypass such groups and reinforce inequality, 
or even to have negative effects by drawing away important labour 
inputs.
This argument implies that the appropriate emphasis of a rural 
strategy in SSA countries will be upon small farmers and herders 
producing their own basic household food requirements, and also 
either a food crop surplus or an industrial or export crop to
generate cash income. The emphasis in production is likely to be
upon food crops for domestic consumption, in particular on root 
crops and, in many cases, inferior (coarse) grains which tend to
form the bulk of the diet of those at nutritional risk - which is
not to say that opportunities to expand incomes by producing
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other types of marketed crop should be ignored. Among nomadic 
peoples dependent upon livestock for subsistence, there will be a 
corresponding emphasis upon food supply and, since there is less 
potential for product diversification, income generation will 
also depend upon strengthening the livestock economies. The 
emphasis in provision of support facilities and social services 
should be upon the same groups, and such provision should form an 
important part of projects - recognising that inadequate access 
to these facilities reduces incentives, affects human 
productivity, and probably hampers aptitude for innovation.
It is not clear that areas where the poorest groups are 
concentrated in general have low potential cost benefit ratios 
for investment. There will be exceptions where initial
infrastructure costs are substantial, or in those ecologically 
sub-marginal zones into which increasing numbers of people are 
being forced by the pressure of population growth. In general, 
however, there is no correlation between size of holding and 
yield per acre or cost of production among S S A 's small and medium 
scale farmers. Investment, service and information starved 
households (including those headed by women) might be expected to 
show a higher marginal output response to additional resource 
injections than those previously better supplied.
Elaboration Of A Strategy For The Rural Poor 
An analytical approach
The divergence in present situations, policies and problems makes 
the attempt to devise an operational strategy or even a common 
set of priorities beyond the broadest level (eg calls for more 
food production, more export earnings, more rural income) 
hazardous. If undertaken in too generalised a fashion, it is 
likely to point national strategies in a common direction which, 
in reality, matches the circumstances of no one country. Just as 
farmers know one does not grow actual crops on average annual 
rainfall (and its average seasonal distribution) so agricultural 
planners should appreciate that strategies for actual 
agricultural sectors are not best designed on the basis of some 
regional SSA average set of experiences, policies and problems. 
The real need is for an analytical approach to development 
strategy for the rural poor which will permit workable strategies 
to be elaborated in differing local circumstances. It should 
point to the questions that need to be asked, the items in the 
policy environment that may need attention, and the issues that 
are commonly neglected.
Whatever the individual circumstances, however, no direct efforts 
to promote rural development are likely to succeed if the wider 
economic and social policy environment is inimical to a
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government's professed goals. If rural development initiatives 
in, for example, public expenditure allocation, pricing policy or 
infrastructure provision, are offset by urban wage rises, heavy 
taxation of rural production and expensive marketing systems then 
there is likely to be little progress. In any real state, the 
achievement of a framework of policy and institutions conducive 
to rural development is not simply a matter of benign government;
it requires that the poorest rural groups gain sufficient access 
to assets, services and influence upon decision-making to be able 
to ensure their position against other competing groups. Rural 
development efforts need to be directed towards improving this 
access, as well as towards the more obvious goal of improvement 
in living standards.
Emphasis on smallholder production and on food may make it easier 
to achieve convergence of output and distribution aims, and a 
focus upon the poorest. It does not guarantee it. In several 
countries (eg Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya) highly favoured 
large-scale commercial farms produce most of the marketed foods 
and, given present supporting systems, could respond most rapidly 
to new incentives. Similarly, not all smallholders have equal 
advantages or disadvantages with respect to farm size or 
location. Concentration upon the more aggressive, better off 
small-holders - particularly if combined with removal of 
territorial producer price equalisation - may accentuate income 
differentials within the smallholder sector, yielding most 
benefits to those already at higher income levels and located 
near major urban markets. It is therefore necessary to devise 
criteria for identifying the poorest groups and evaluating the 
measures most likely to reach them, to remove existing obstacles 
to local development, and to emphasise those elements of national 
strategy most likely to create conditions in which the poor can 
benefit.
Identifying the target group
There are relatively few cases in SSA where inequality (and 
landlessness) within a low-income rural area makes it impossible 
to consider the people of the area as the target group, in the 
sense that households share similar levels of nutrition and 
income, and face similar problems in raising output. This is 
not to argue that there are no intra-rural inequalities, but to 
suggest that the first task in a poverty-focused strategy is 
usually to rank the food/income levels and relative vulnerability 
of different areas.
There are two broad distinctions that can be made among poor 
rural areas, relevant to the formulation of distinct strategies. 
The first is between semi-arid drought-prone areas with major 
fluctuations in total product, and irrigated or securely rain-fed
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areas. The second is between areas with major research inputs, 
adapted to packages economically attractive to farmers, on or 
near the threshold of availability (all of which is likely to 
imply that wider infrastructure provision is relatively good), 
and other areas. Clearly, in areas that are securely rain-fed 
and have opportunities for innovation readily available the 
potential for output increases is likely to be great, and 
straightforward measures such as the provision of credit can 
yield quick results. In areas at the other extreme, the
required measures are likely to be different and more complex.
These distinctions encompass a range of areas where incomes and 
food security are exposed to differing degrees of risk, around 
differing initial levels of yield and food-availability per 
person. The risks which need to be assessed are those of
climatic and other events which, taken in conjunction with the 
initial level of food availability per person, place significant 
proportions of people in an area in substantial danger of
undernourishment sufficiently severe to endanger physical or 
mental health, work capacity or infant or child growth.
In the least favourably-placed areas, the risk is that several 
different sorts of unfavourable contingency are imposed upon an 
initially low base level. Both the contingencies and the level 
are of two types: social and environmental. For example:
environmentally, people in semi-arid and eroded (or over-grazed) 
areas tend to suffer low levels of nutrition and income.
Socially, younger children in large families, especially those 
with relatively little access to additional land, are similarly
exposed. As regards risk, several environmental factors interact 
variability of annual rainfall (unfortunately highest in 
semi-arid areas), liability to pest attack or weed infestation, 
concentration upon one marketed crop with high price instability.
Socially, risk depends mainly upon exposure to disease, and on 
the costs of doing something about disease when it strikes; 
again, both tend to be relatively high for families with large 
numbers of children, which are also the families likely to be at 
the lowest absolute level of income and nutrition per head.
Such an analysis provides a means for deciding how groups at risk 
differ. It also provides pointers to the appropriate means for 
improvement. Low-risk, well-served areas are probably best 
helped by improved access to inputs - provided that the inputs, 
and technical packages in general, have been fully field-tested 
in local conditions. In areas of high risk, efforts to reduce 
the vulnerability of output and incomes to drought, pests, or 
disease may enhance people's willingness to invest, and thus to 
improve the average level of income and nutrition; that, in 
turn, makes a given level of risk more tolerable. On the other 
hand, introduction of further risk - eg use of fertilisers in an 
insecurely watered, poor area - is unlikely to succeed if the
10
expected (average) returns to the new technique are quite high. 
An improvement in the base level of incomes and nutrition - for 
example, by use of better seed varieties - would also increase 
people's ability to withstand risk: in a bad year, achievement
of, say, a quarter of average production would be more tolerable 
if the average were larger, and more surpluses from good years 
could be stored to cope with bad ones.
Direct risk-reduction measures are rarely straightforward to 
implement (or uncontroversial). It is vital, however, that they 
are attempted where possible, and that projects in risk-prone, 
poorly-served areas are not restricted to provision of credit and 
technical assistance. The failure of straightforward credit 
projects in such areas in the past has helped to reinforce the 
myth that African peasants (especially those predominantly 
engaged in growing their own food) cannot handle credit, whereas 
the fault probably lies with inadequate diagnosis of the 
constraints upon, and vulnerability of, farming systems. In 
risk-prone areas, there will often be a strong case for provision 
of free or low-priced health care, pest control, and even of 
direct irrigation measures. For example, where drought-risk is 
high, the case for reducing risk of Quelea bird attack, perhaps 
by varietal selection (of crops) is strengthened. Methods of 
water conservation are controversial and uncertain, but in some 
areas it may be possible to advance micro-irrigation: the use of
sand rivers, low-lift pumps, (since rivers and streams can be 
deep enough even in areas of poor rainfall), or rainwater 
catchment tanks.
Recognising the role of women
The strengthening of self-provisioning production system also 
implies recognition of the role of women in African agriculture, 
and efforts to reduce social and economic discrimination against 
them. Despite the widespread dependence of traditional
production systems upon female labour, very little extension
effort or addition to infrastructure has been specifically 
directed towards women. New cash crops, and the adoption of 
technical innovations, have tended to be regarded as a male 
preserve, while the emphasis upon males as targets for extension 
work has itself diverted resources and attention from subsistence 
food production systems. Part of the problem is a lack of female 
extension workers, but there is also a need to appraise 
priorities for rural investment against the particular type of
labour input that will benefit from them: for example,
accessible pure water and an accessible communal or household 
woodlot may make relatively little difference to male
productivity but a substantial difference to the number of
directly productive hours women can contribute during seasons of 
peak labour requirement.
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The issue is all the more pressing since in many countries, 
subsistence farming is not 'traditionally' organised and 
unchanging but has been forced to adapt to developments elsewhere 
in the economy: in Zambia, for example, an ILO mission estimated 
that in poorer rural areas from which migration has been most 
rapid up to half the households may now have female heads. 
Rural investment and extension which ignores women will, in those 
circumstances, do little to boost rural incomes.
Export crops in perspective
Because of the emphasis placed in the colonial period upon the 
development of cash crops for export, and because in some 
countries (notably in east and central Africa) export crop 
expansion by-passed large sections of the rural population, it is 
sometimes implied that agricultural export production is in 
itself undesirable. In fact, the choice of crop (or of 
alternative forms of land use, such as livestock-herding) will 
depend upon a range of more complex factors: local ecology,
domestic and international market conditions, comparative 
domestic resource costs, and - where product choice is integral 
to elaboration of a poverty-focused strategy - the extent to 
which poorer local farmers can participate in production.
The potential role of export crops in national economic strategy 
will thus vary according to international market conditions for 
the crop concerned, and local circumstances. It is inappropriate 
to call either for a generalised emphasis upon promotion of 
agricultural exports, or sole concentration upon production for 
the domestic market.
Until such time as it becomes possible to assert greater producer 
control over international markets, there are four lines of 
national action on export crops which may be strategically 
appropriate, depending on country and crop. In each case, it is 
not only the economic and social viability of the export crop 
that must be considered, but also the potential loss of 
alternative production - the 'output opportunity cost'.
First, a country could seek to maintain its present market share 
for its principal exports, but refrain from acting to raise it 
substantially if that would have a significant impact on prices - 
either directly, or by helping to trigger a general export 
expansion response by other producers to maintain their market 
sha re.
Second, a country could pursue selective expansion of crops for 
which global demand is characterised by high income elasticities,
and posi t. i ve taste and preference changes over time, which
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outweigh negative effects on producer incomes from pcice 
elasticities of demand. Cashewnuts, citrus fruits, out of season 
and 'exotic' (in high income countries) fruits and vegetables are 
examples relevant to some regions of some SSP countries.
Third, there may be scope for more systematic extension cf
pre-export processing of existing agricultural exports. This has 
the potential not only to increase domestic value-added (provided 
processing can be undertaken on an economic scale and with the 
standard of quality control required for subsequent export) but 
also to minimise the effects of raw material price declines. 
Success with this option depends upon action to remove 
restrictive business and trade practices in consumer countries 
which prevent processing in countries of origin.
Fourth, in a similar vein, there could be further scope for 
identifying agricultural inputs to industry, and substituting for 
those now imported (eg vegetable oils, oil seeds, cotton). In
these cases, industrial input crop production would not raise 
exports, but would reduce imports and strengthen both domestic
manufacturing and its linkages with the agricultural sector.
Within the framework of a general emphasis upon food production 
and strengthening of traditional systems, there are some 
circumstances where efforts to increase the involvement of the 
poorest in non-food cash crop production may be worthwhile. 
First, where food crop and export crop expansion can be sustained 
by the same infrastructure and technical support systems, they 
can reinforce each other in the development of an area: this
appears to have happened in Mali and Upper Volta with cotton as 
the export crop and millet and sorghum as food crops. Second, 
where the provision of additional cash income can increase food 
security, and lower nutritional risk, a cash crop element may be 
required - for example, where there is excessive dependence upon 
a nutritionally inferior crop such as cassava. Third, and most 
obvious, are the cases where food requirements and cash 
supplements can be met from the same source: in maize
production, livestock-based systems, or development of 
smallstock.
Pricing and procurement policies
Inadequate price incentives for marketed production are now 
commonly thought to have been a major obstacle to agricultural 
output growth in SSA. It is clear that shifts in relative prices 
among crops affect farmers' choices among their production 
options, and that even aggregate supply of agricultural 
commodities is somewhat affected by price incentives; the scale
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and speed of this aggregate effect, and the effect on the rural 
poorest, are much more doubtful or, at least, variable from case 
to case.
The impact on output depends upon what the constraints are; 
price increases will be effective in raising output if existing 
prices are so low as to mean there is no effective market, or if 
they allow the purchase of additional inputs, but not if the key 
constraint is peak season labour demand and no substitute can be 
purchased. Except in isolated or remote areas, there is little 
evidence to suggest that there is much spare capacity in peasant 
production systems unless additional inputs, knowledge, labour or 
market access are injected. In general, increases in money 
prices will be of little use if neither input nor incentive goods 
are available to be purchased. Apparent problems with price 
levels are often due to poor purchasing and payment 
administration. Prompt cash payments at relatively assured 
prices and times (announced well before the sowing season) and at 
buying points readily accessible to farmers, could be as 
effective an incentive to increased marketing - and even 
increased output - as formal price increases.
Procurement, transport and storage systems (public and private) 
are frequently weak, especially for food crops, and still more 
for the coarse grain and root crops which could form the marketed 
surplus of subsistence-orientated producers. Buyers are
unavailable, or marketing systems high cost (whether as a result 
of inefficiency or of very high distributors' margins makes 
little difference to the grower). Transport is high cost, 
unreliable and scarce. Combined with inadequate and badly 
located storage facilities, the transport weaknesses often entail 
long haulage distances and the need to move the entire 
commercialised crop in a few months, contributing to both 
increased costs and physical shortage. Inadequate commercial 
storage can lead to appalling grain spoilage rates in store - up 
to 15 per cent a year in Tanzania, in comparison to a global norm 
of 2 \ per cent and even better performance in Zimbabwe (li per 
cent achieved in 1980). Research in Africa and elsewhere 
suggests that on-farm storage of grain is usually relatively 
low-loss; incorporation of simple on-farm storage methods (eg 
hard pads) into output-increasing projects could thus yield 
worthwhile results.
For the root crops and coarse grains grown by many poor farmers, 
the lack of an effective market to absorb production beyond 
self-provisioning requirements can be one of the key constraints 
on raising incomes. Local private trading is likely to be the 
principal marketing channel, and assurance of substantial 
purchases at known prices may be difficult for farmers to 
achieve. The strengthening of local marketing with, for
example, credit and storage facilities can make an important
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contribution, as can encouragement to large-scale public and 
private marketing agencies to deal in root and coarse-grain 
crops. However, what can be achieved depends heavily on whether 
a substantial urban market for the crops exists in normal years - 
as it does for root crops in West Africa but not for millet, 
sorghum and cassava in East Africa.
Rural infrastructure
Poor access to basic rural services may be a cause of production 
problems for three reasons. First, it encourages the rural
population to leave the land if urban income prospects are even 
roughly similar because those for pure water, primary education 
and health care are often much better. Second, water and 
firewood collection can take up very large portions of women's
working time and can use up hundreds of calories a day; this
will have evident implications as to the crop production 
potential of rural water and woodlot programmes. Third, better 
education and better health are investments in people, and 
especially in SSA healthy (able to work harder) and educated 
(able to learn how to work more effectively) people are central 
to the solution of all priority problems.
The improvement of rural infrastructure is likely to be the key 
element of a risk-reducing strategy for the rural poor in the 
risk-prone, poorly-served areas. There are, however, difficult 
problems in selecting approaches to infrastructure provision.
The poorest areas are often those where road-building, 
well-boring, construction of schools or health centres by 
conventional means are most difficult and costly. There are 
instances where infrastructure provision has in fact damaged the 
interests of the poor: the best known example is that of water
provision for nomadic livestock-herding people - availability of 
wells has often encouraged sedentary cultivators or herders to 
move onto the land, thus reducing the land area available to the 
pastoral people.
Research and technical choice
There are wide differences in the degree of access to appropriate 
technological packages, but it has been argued that the pace of 
development and injection of output-improving techniques has 
generally been slower in SSA than elsewhere. This can be
attributed to a combination of lack of emphasis upon research; 
poor use of existing research facilities; above all, failure to 
field-test the economic viability and safety of potential 
innovations on the small farm in the ecological areas, farming 
systems and other circumstances where they are supposed to be 
adopted. There has also been a lack of suitable extension and
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delivery facilities for technical changes (eg micro-irrigation, 
animal traction) which are known and proven. Frequent changes of 
advice reduce farmers' confidence in research results and 
extension agents; conflicting advice has been given on such 
crucial matters as crop-mixes and the timing of ploughing and 
sowing with a view to water conservation. In the medium term, it 
will be essential to develop African research expertise in the 
agriculture and small-farm economics of technical improvements, 
including new varieties, especially for coarse cereals and root 
crops.
Misplaced emphasis on 'modern' farming systems has occasionally 
contributed to ecological damage that has weakened subsistence 
farming. For example, many African soils are not suitable for 
deep ploughing or even physically able to stand up to heavy 
equipment (which may compact light soils, permitting more rapid 
erosion, or break up hard pans previously preventing upward 
percolation of saline water). Similarly, pure stands (as
opposed to intercropping) may reduce output in the medium term 
because, in the absence of compensating inputs, they increase net 
offtake of nutrients or lead to enhanced wind and water erosion.
It is important to ensure that research initiatives build in, 
from the beginning, procedures to test the applicability of 
outcomes at the level of the subsistence farmers' plots in the 
various ecologies, economic circumstances and degrees of 
risk-proneness within the region to which the results are 
supposed to apply. Given the volume of research results coming 
into practical use in other parts of the developing world, it is 
possible to be optimistic about potential in Africa provided that 
this basic field-testing requirement is met.
Technical choices must take into account cost-effectiveness, 
adaptability and impact upon the poor. For example, where there 
is a labour constraint (seasonal or otherwise) the welfare of the 
very poor may depend on the choice of animal rather than 
mechanical techniques of traction. Where labour is plentiful 
many poor people will rely on labour income, and again avoidance 
of job-destroying mechanisation will be preferable. Many areas 
of Africa (eg Western Sudan) are going directly from 
hoe-cultivation to tractor-civilisation with no serious 
consideration of the intervening animal option. Mechanised 
options mean heavy concentration of income in few hands, 
potential monopoly rents to those who can obtain licences to 
import, in many cases deterioration of top soils and wind 
erosion, and no improvement in yields. They can be justified 
where there is a binding labour constraint yet (at least in some 
seasons) spare land, and where the animal traction option is for 
some reason demonstrably impracticable or inferior; but the 
important task is to consider the alternatives.
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There are similar problems with the choice between 
area-increasing and yield-increasing technology where land is 
available and the objective is to reach the rural poor. 
Land-increasing technology can sometimes operate with minimum 
additional purchased inputs (and therefore risk), whereas 
yield-increasing technology requires more finance and inputs to 
ensure success. This choice, however, needs to be made with 
great care. Area-increasing technology can make greater demands 
on transport, storage and marketing facilities; it must also 
generate sufficient return to cover labour and other costs of 
land preparation. Area increases will also be of little benefit 
to the poorest if better-off farmers expand their cultivated area 
without significantly increasing their demand for labour.
Support systems and rural institutions
The attitudes of politicians and officials to peasants are often 
a major problem. Lack of understanding and resort to coercion 
are more characteristic than respect and a willingness to learn 
from the peasant. Where local institutions are dominated by 
'imported' (expatriate or African) officials, decision making 
tends to reflect these attitudes. They reinforce the general 
weakness of support systems for rural development. The 
organisation of development activities through home-grown 
institutions controlled by farmers and villagers is often 
important for overcoming the effects of these attitudes: it can
ensure that farmers' views are transmitted to other authorities, 
and elicit a positive village response to suggestions from 
outside. Understanding of the local social system is a 
pre-requisite for fostering village institutions; the lack of 
adequate rural institutions is due in part to failed attempts to 
create structures that could not be meshed with the social 
organisation of the people intended to use them - hence, for 
example, the widespread difficulties experienced with the 
promotion of cooperatives.
Suggested institutional reforms and administrative improvements 
must in any case be within the capacity of the state concerned, 
and must be put forward in a way that will not encounter major 
political or bureaucratic resistance. The balance between
public and private sector is rarely a matter of straightforward 
choice; there will be local political preferences, and probably 
multiple options under either ownership framework. For example, 
with input delivery systems, the requirement is usually to 
increase efficiency and input availability, and wider competition 
and incentives may be needed; but it does not follow that 
incentives cannot be provided within the public sector, or that 
competition cannot involve various parts of the public and/or 
cooperative sectors, as well as, or even instead of, the private 
sector - as the experience of Bangladesh shows.
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Consulting rural people
One obvious way to assess the needs of a target group, and the
obstacles to meeting them, is to ask the farmers themselves, and
to ask them in an open-ended, unbiased way that produces answers 
reflecting the farmers' own views and not what they think the 
questioner wants to hear. The answers can upset preconceptions, 
and can be surprisingly diverse even in relatively small areas. 
The point is not that rural communities always know best - 
although they are at least as likely as outsiders (including 
national experts) to know what is best for themselves. Rather, 
it is necessary to stress that this sort of appraisal of rural
needs is likely to be an important corrective to impressions
gained in casual visits by urban-based officials (or overseas 
experts) and to the common political and bureaucratic assumptions 
about farmers' needs and behaviour. It is equally important to 
realise that projects and programmes which do not respond to 
farmers' own perception of their needs will have a high chance of 
failure. If six kilometre daily walks for water eat up 25 per 
cent of women's working time at harvest season (and use 300-350 
calories), or baboons spoil up to 33 per cent of maize cobs, then 
pure water and vermin control are strategic priorities in that 
context, and little will be achieved until they are addressed.
Regional approaches
Shared national problems can sometimes best be tackled on a 
regional basis. Moreover, certain food security problems can 
only be tackled if there is a co-ordinated effort among 
neighbouring states. Where there is extensive legal and illegal 
cross-border trade in food - as is the case in many parts of West 
Africa - food security cannot be ensured by national action 
alone: administration, controls and incentives in one state
affect the perceptions of producers, traders and consumers in 
neighbouring states.
There is a long history of regional collaboration over 
agricultural and veterinary research programmes in SSA. Such 
collaboration urgently needs expansion and development, 
especially in risk-prone, semi-arid areas - hence the focus on 
research collaboration among the Sahelian states and those of the 
Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). 
The search for such regional opportunities is an important part 
of the elaboration of strategy in a national and local context.
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Problems of Implementation
Administration
Probably the most widely cited reason for the failure of rural 
development projects and programmes in SSA is poor administration 
- a combination of a lack of administrative skills in the first 
place, and maladministration once a project structure is in 
place. The problem has its origins not only in the physical 
shortage of adequately trained people (in any case, in terms of 
qualifications such a shortage no longer exists in a number of 
SSA countries, at least at higher levels - the middle level 
personnel situation is usually much poorer), but also in the lack 
of incentives for qualified, experienced and adaptable nationals 
to work in rural projects. However, even the personnel issue is 
only part of the problem - national and local administrative 
structures have tended to become over-burdened, conservative and, 
in some cases, have even broken down altogether.
There are two types of response to this problem. The first, and 
most commonly adopted, is to set up an organisation for project 
administration which is independent of government structures (at 
least as far as recruitment, procurement and budget management 
are concerned), and in which there are substantial requirements 
for technical and administrative expertise - to be met by use of 
expatriates, and the institution of a training programme for 
highly-educated 'counterpart' staff who are supposed to take over 
the project in three, four or five years' time. It is now 
evident that this approach has multiple disadvantages: it is not
locally replicable, and so the project becomes an enclave rather
than an example; it does little to strengthen national or 
district administration (indeed, potential conflicts with 
government administration can frustrate the purposes of both 
project and government); it adds to future recurrent costs and 
skill demands, and is thus liable to collapse after a donor 
allocation has been spent; it is an expensive use of available 
resources, especially in foreign exchange terms; above all, it 
usually implies a structure independent of, and certainly not 
controlled by, the rural community it is supposed to serve, it 
therefore does not build up local institutions or community 
participation, and risks a lack of response by farmers to an
alien imposition.
The alternative response tries to develop project administration 
from elements of the local social structure, and to minimise use 
of scarce (foreign and national) high-level skills. IFAD has 
experimented with such an approach, for example, in a recent 
credit project in Mali with an unusual degree of local
participation in the running of the project. Expanded and
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improved training of middle-level personnel - e.g., field 
extension workers, research technicians, data collection
assistants - can be seen as a complement to this approach.
Infrastructure cost and provision
The second set of implementation constraints concerns the alleged 
high cost of providing rural infrastructure in SSA. The cost of 
construction of major physical assets (roads, bridges, schools, 
hospitals, irrigation channels) is likely to be relatively high 
if construction is undertaken by conventional means - employing a 
company, using mechanised techniques and skilled labour. There 
are two types of explanation for this problem: the first
emphasises factors contributing to high costs, such as wage rates 
(relative to productivity), protection of industry, lack of 
economies of scale and transport difficulties; the second points 
to the relative underdevelopment of non-farm construction and 
service activities in rural SSA compared with other regions of 
the world. Part of the response to this difficulty lies at the 
macroeconomic level, especially wage policies, and other aspects 
of incentives to deploy skills in rural areas. But more direct 
responses are possible within projects, by seeking low-cost 
solutions for particular infrastructure needs, and by 
deliberately promoting (with training, credit and market 
information) the development of locally-provided non-farm 
services.
There is great potential for the mobilisation of rural 
communities to provide labour, local materials and cash to meet 
substantial portions of the capital and maintenance costs of 
smaller-scale rural infrastructure. The facilities amenable to 
this construction approach include: feeder roads (dry season
building); 'boxes' to provide passage across shallow or seasonal 
water courses (ie concrete or brick base on the riverbed, not a 
bridge); clinics; godowns (up to about 100 tonnes storage 
capacity); primary schools; housing for public service workers; 
shallow wells; water pipe trenches, woodlots and watershed tree 
plantations; small-scale irrigation (rills, furrows, check 
dams); terracing, contouring and other soil works; land 
clearing, including bush clearing for tsetse eradication if there 
is a use to which the cleared land can be put which will keep the 
bush down.
There are a number of basic requirements for realising this rural 
construction potential. The population has to be moderately 
dense, or clustered in villages. There must be village 
institutions with local roots, and legitimacy to propose, select 
and participate in decisions on projects; the views of these 
institutions must be incorporated into any schemes proposed by 
national governments or external agencies, so that rural
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residents will respond to such projects because they see them as 
theirs. A set of complementary inputs will be needed - provision 
of which is an obvious part of a rural development project:
skilled labour; simple designs for rural community use; 
training in the construction and maintenance of simple 
facilities; materials not locally available; tools; recurrent 
inputs for rural services (eg a nurse, or drugs for a clinic); 
monitoring of progress.
This is a case for rural self-organisation that is relevant not 
only where costs are high, but also - of great importance at 
present - where budgetary resources are severely strained. More
rural production and infrastructure can be secured without a 
large budgetary burden, on condition that a village council and a 
village fund controlled by villagers are established. It will 
encourage villagers (and possibly even more dispersed rural 
communities) to act together and to gain experience in drawing 
resources from government. It is therefore likely to provide a
starting point for organising to participate and bargain.
Village or communal direct investment does not depend on any 
particular ideology underlying national political and economic 
programmes; both Kenya and Tanzania, for example, have had high 
levels of such local investment for almost two decades.
Information constraints
The preceding discussion of administration, technology and
infrastructure constraints upon project success has suggested
that solutions are available provided sufficient options are 
examined, and priority is given to rooting the project in local 
communities and institutions. Projects are also hampered by 
information deficiences in the formal process of project 
preparation and appraisal. Unsatisfactory information and
appraisal not only distort the workings of a project, they also 
bias the selection of project focus in the first place. The
situation is especially bad for projects aimed at subsistence 
cultivators.
First, data about output and sales in African agriculture are 
weak and unreliable. In very few SSA countries are estimates of 
'subsistence' production (which usually includes short distance 
and minor crop cash sales) based on actual local level estimates, 
and in only one or two on proper crop-cutting sampling of output 
or analogous (and difficult) procedures for root crops and mixed 
stands. As a result estimates of levels, trends or changes -
especially year to year - cannot be accepted as realistic without
checking both methodology and oasic data (if any). In 
agricultural production as a whole, for several countries there 
is a variety of output series with quite different coverage,
basis of estimation and resultant levels and growth rates of
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output. While appearances may help to check the plausibility of 
series they too can be deceptive, especially if year to year 
variations have been high. Even for export crops official output 
figures are often highly inaccurate. For 'minor products' (which 
in cases where root crops, cooking bananas, vegetables, poultry, 
eggs, meat and milk are significant, can amount to a high 
proportion of total domestic food production and even of cash 
sales by rural households) there may be no serious estimates at 
all, or at best rough guesses based on non-random observations of 
a few farms, or of a few households'calorie intaken patterns and 
levels. In many cases these gaps or guesses are even more 
serious at regional and local levels - which are the important 
data sets for project design. The lesson is not to abandon data 
use, but to keep its reliability in perspective, to complement it 
by building local survey elements into projects, and to devote 
resources to strengthening national data gathering and processing 
capabilities.
Second, deficiencies are possibly even worse in information about 
farm management and agricultural practice. The number of
carefully studied cases appears fortunately to be growing, but
for many different crops and ecologies there are few accurate, 
detailed studies of typical input and output patterns of African 
farmers, and even those which do exist are rarely random and 
numerous enough to allow national or regional aggregation. 
Previously available information has often led to wrong advice 
(such as that about intercropping and deep ploughing, previously 
cited), and it also greatly adds to the range of uncertainty and 
potential error in project design and appraisal. The same is 
true where proposed technical packages have not in fact been 
field tested in the project area, or in closely similar
conditions; likely levels and combinations of input requirements 
and output potential can vary greatly from location to location, 
and the differences can undermine project calculations derived 
from elsewhere. The same imperatives for project appraisal apply 
here; available information must be treated with scepticism,
field tests must be built into the project, and efforts to
strengthen field research are a necessary complement to direct 
income and output-raising activities.
Appraisal techniques
These deficiencies can be compounded by established lines of 
project analysis. Projected rates of return are often heavily 
dependent upon the actual results of untested innovations and on 
somewhat artificial estimation of uses of labour time freed by 
projects such as pure water systems and wood lots. They are also 
critically dependent on estimates as to how many farmers will 
adopt new practices, take up loans, use new services, have actual 
access to new inputs - none of which are easily subject to any
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accurate ex ante forecasting. World Bank evaluation of project 
appraisal and performance suggests that accuracy of rate of
return predictions depends more heavily upon adoption rate 
predictions than upon any other factor except relative prices. 
Whether this means that the basic problem is in extension or that 
good technical packages result in high adoption and poor in low 
is somewhat less clear. The degree of optimism or pessimism in
projections varies widely, but it is not often spelled out
explicitly enough for any decision-taker or outside analyst to 
form a meaningful judgement on how cautious, or otherwise, cost 
and benefit stream estimates have been. Projections tend to be 
single point - especially for rates of return but often also for 
additional output. Output increases are often calculated on the 
basis that without the project there would be no change which is 
not normally the most likely alternative. The single point 
estimates are sometimes qualified by sensitivity tests, but these 
do not make the basic uncertainties as clear to the non-technical 
reviewer as would an indication of the potential range of 
assumptions. There is a need to test the sensitivity to price 
errors of, first, the value of project outputs and inputs, and,
second, choice of actual outputs and inputs by farmers.
The non-fulfilment of apparently precise and technically rigorous 
projections is in itself damaging to the prospects for increased 
allocation of resources to rural development projects. It is 
probably better to combine efforts to improve data on output and 
farming systems with a realistic recognition that investment in 
rural development always involves a substantial, if variable, 
degree of risk and uncertainty. The wider justification for 
taking the risk is no less apparent if the risk in individual 
projects is evident.
Reaching the poorest
The most obvious implementation difficulty is that of reaching 
the poorest groups at all when they are located in the least
ecologically-promising areas, receive least by way of social and 
physical infrastructure provision from governments, and are 
liable to find resources intended for them diverted to richer and 
more skilled people. In this environment, even well-designed, 
organised and staffed programmes can run into great difficulty.
There are no simple rules for overcoming this basic problem. But 
it is more likely that new resources will reach their target if 
the method of delivery is relatively simple in organisation,
concentrates on the food products relied upon by the poorest 
groups, and brings with it social and other services which reduce
risk. In situations of skill scarcity, foreign exchange and
government revenue shortage there will be little point in setting 
up activities heavily reliant on future imports and government
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support; i£ these things are available they are in any case more 
likely to be appropriated by those already accustomed to using 
them.
Conclusions
without an acceleration of rural development the prospects for 
recovery from the deteriorating economic conditions currently 
being experienced in large parts of SSA are poor. The required 
strategy of rural development, if it is to have lasting positive 
effects, must concentrate upon the poorest rural groups: those
most at nutritional risk because they cannot afford or produce 
enough food or secure access to adequate preventive health care, 
and those least well served by existing infrastructure and 
opportunities for innovation. In terms of production the priority 
most neglected by current strategic proposals, and perhaps most 
promising in itself is to increase output of cheap calorie 
sources by poor rural people for their own consumption. This, 
however, does not imply abandonment of efforts to produce 
marketed food or industrial crops where a significant income 
advantage to the poorest is likely to result. In areas of high 
vulnerability, the principal focus will be upon risk reduction, 
by direct means (such as irrigation schemes) and by indirect 
means involving wider access to public services. In areas where 
output and incomes are already more secure, growth requires 
greater availability of new input packages and the financial 
resources for farmers to apply them. Where possible, the keynote 
of the strategy as a whole, and of efforts to relax individual 
constraints should be the active participation of the rural 
community: self-organisation, community contributions, and
minimum imposition of outside structures and personnel consistent 
with the requirements of innovation and technical improvement.
Elaboration of the strategy in the highly varied country and 
regional circumstances of SSA requires simple steps to identify 
the priority areas - which tend to be co-incident with target 
groups - and to classify them according to degree of risk, access 
to services, and ecological type. In each set of circumstances, 
the common problems noted in SSA will have differing importance 
and implications - identical responses will not suit all 
circumstances. Project design itself must be adapted to meet 
known obstacles, and appraisal techniques would benefit from a 
more realistic appreciation of information weaknesses and basic 
uncertainties.
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